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INTRODUCTION
In the Netherlands, wage increases in the public sector have been
systematically lower that those in the private sector throu^out the
1980s. This policy was based on a perceived need to reduce public
expenditure and an assumption that public-sector wages exceeded
private-sector wa^s. However, a comprehen»ve pay comparison per
job level (Van der Hoek, 1%9) concluded that the latter assumption
only holds true for the two lowest job levels where public-sector
w^es exceed market-sector wages by approximately 4 percent. On
higher job levels, public-sector pay appeared to be behind market-
sector pay, implying that approximately two-thirds of government
workers earn less than their private-sector counterparts. This gap
amoimts to 3 percent on level 3 and increases to 24 percent on the
highest job level (Level 7).'^
The apparent gap between pubUc- and market-sector pay in the
Netherlands is far from unique. In other countries, public-sector
employees have also lost ground in relative average wage position to
their private-sector counterparts (Elliot and Murphy, 1987; Oxleycf a/.,
1990; Wise, 1988). Despite this pay gap, there is no unambiguous
and solid evidence that the recruitment of highly qualified personnel
poses a general problem in the Netherlands. The turnover in high
dvil service positions does not exceed the average.^  According to the
Dutch Interior Minister, the public sector does not face such general
bottlenecks as a demander in the labor market that structural
measures are needed (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken, 1990b: 1).
Nonetheless, by the end of 1987 the Dutch government introduced
two instruments of a so-called differential pay policy.
The first was retention bonuses. These are temporary bonuses
that are paid once or several times a year on the condition that the
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individual involved will stay in his or her job for a period of, in prin-
ciple, at least three years. If he or she leaves within the designated
period, the bonus must be refunded. The second was labor market
allowances which are temporary additions that are paid monthly and
increase the salary unconditionally.
In addition to the retention bonus and the labor-market allow-
ances, other possibilities to credit employees with extra rewards
already existed: bonuses, personal allowances, and extra annual
increments. A minority of employees who are awarded an addition
also enjoy extra rewards in another form: 15 percent in 1988 and 28
percent in 1989. However, most ministries set limitations on the
accumulation of extra rewards, e.g., in the form of a maximum
percentage of the gross annual salary or a maximum absolute
amount. Ministries tend to integrate the different arrangements,
often in an attempt to link pay to performance.
Some personnel managers have the impression that retention
bonuses and labor-market allowances pioneer a performance-based
pay system. Yet these instruments were developed in order to coun-
teract perceived bottlenecks in the supply of specific groups who are
scarce and who can possibly earn more in the private sector. Four
groups were centrally designated: accountants, automation experts,
financial economists, and tax experts. In addition, agencies may
apply the instruments to individuals outside these groups while
agencies may also designate other groups eligible for either of the
supplements.
An investigation into the application of these instruments in the
central government sector was carried out in the Netherlands {Stichting
Het Nederlands Economisch Institut, 1990). In this article the author
will mainly review the results of this study which is based on existing
statistics, interviews with personnel managers of six ministries (both
on the central level and on lower levels within these ministries) and a
survey of 327 civil servants who received either a retention bonus or
a labor market allowance.
Table 1 compares the respondents with all government workers
as to the division over the 18 salary scales that are used in the central
government sector. It appears that respondents are somewhat over-
represented in the upper salary scale, suggesting that the additions
are mainly channelled to the higher grades and that ministries con-
sider bottlenecks less perceptible in the lower grades which would be
in line with the fact that the gap between public- and market-sector
pay emerges in the higher salary scales.
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TABLE 1
DIVISION OF RESPONDENTS OVER SALARY SCALES,
1988
Scale Respondents Total
1-11 37 52
12-13 35 23
14-18 28 25
Total
Scale
100
TABLE 2
SHARE OF WOMEN IN SALARY
Share of women
among respondents
SCALES
Share of
100
women
in total
7-1 3 13
12-13 11 10
14-18 2 9
Total 6 25
TABLE 3
EMPLOYMENT IN CENTRAL GOVERNMENT, 1988
age group men women
<25 40 60
25-34 70 30
35-44 83 17
45-54 84 16
>55 87 13
PAQ FALL 1994 {329)
APPLICATION
A majority of the ministries apply either retention bonuses or
labor market allowances while a limited number applies both in-
struments. Retention bonuses are more frequently applied than
labor market allowances: the ratio amounts to 2:1, One reason for
choosing labor market additions as an instrument is that the prob-
lem of reclaiming (a part of) the premium cannot occur .^  A reason
for choosing retention bonuses is to make clear to the employees
involved that the addition is nonrecurrent. Thus, officially there are
major differences between retention bonuses and labor market
allowances, as pointed out in the previous section.
In practice, however, these differences appear to be much small-
er. Labor market allowances tend to be paid annually rather than
monthly. Moreover, receivers of an addition do not always know
whether it is actually a retention bonus or a labor market allowance.
One of the recipients even noted that the same addition was called a
retention bonus in one year and a labor market allowance in another
year. Therefore, it seems advisable to introduce one imiform addi-
tion under one label.
Supplements are mainly awarded to men: only 6 percent are
women.^ This has something to do with the fact that women are
concentrated in the lower salary scales. But, even if one takes this
into account, the proportion of women in the additions is relatively
low, except in grades 12 and 13, as shown in Table 2.
There are at least two additional factors causing a low percentage
of women in the supplements. First, occupational segregation: the
share of women in the centrally designated groups is low. For the
total group of accountants, it amounts to 6 percent, for automation
experts 7 percent, and 11 percent for financial economists. This is of
relevance because 85-90 percent of the supplements are awarded in
these groups; second, the low proportion rate of women relative to
that of men.
Table 3 exhibits that the proportion of women in central govern-
ment employment is not only in general lower than that of men, but
the difference also increases by age group. The share of women
amounts to 30 percent in one age group 25-34 and only 17 percent in
the age group 35-44 (Ministrie van Binnenlandse Zaken, 1989:58).
This contributes to a low percentage of women in the supplements
because receivers of additions are highly concentrated in the age
group 35-44. The proportion of this latter group amounts to 57
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percent ^ereas the category 25-44 has a share of 22 percent and the
age group 45-54 has a share of only 17 percent. The high percentage
of the 25-44-year-olds may be due to the fact that, for younger
employees, other possibilities for extra pay increases are feasible,
e.g., by accelerated passfa^ tibrcM]|^ the sabry scales, v^ereas older
employees are less tilcely coasadering a transfer to the private sector.
Moreover, the nuni^es rep<Hrt that the recruitment of newcomers
to the labor market is not too difficult. As far as problems do occur,
they are related to recruitment and retention of experienced em-
ployees.
The supplements are mainly awarded to persons in the higher
salary scales. Two-thirds of the receivers of an addition are classified
in grade 11 or higher whereas only 13 percent of the persons em-
ployed in the public sector are dass^ed in these grades. No wonder
that in ^neral they are well-educated. Over three-quarters have a
bachelor's or a master's degree. On average, the supplements
amount to 9 percent of the gross annual wage which approxbmately
equals a montMy salary. Therefore, a number of respondents refer
to the addition as the "lSth monthly salary." The amount of the
supplements varies widely across ministries. The averages per minis-
try vary between 6 and 15 percent of the gross annual salary.
Opinions on the size of the atkfitions differ, but over 50 percent
of the respondents ju^e their addition too low. Not surprisii^y, the
extent of contentedness increases, the higher the addition one re-
ceives. On the macro level, however, the quantitative significance of
the supplements is very limited. Only 2 percent of all civil servants
are awarded an addition while the total sum involved amounts to
approximately 0.25 percent of the wage sum. Consequently, the
impact of the supplements on the female/male wage gap and on
overall pay disparUy both withm the ptilklic sector and between the
puMic and private sector must be n^^^pl)k. In terms of Frederick-
son's (1990) compound theory of social equky and pubic administra-
tion, neither segmented equality (within the category) nor block
equality (between categories) can significantly be affected by the
additions.
It is notable that 22 percent of the retention bonuses are awarded
under the condition that the receiver stays in his job for at least one
year. Accordii^ to the ol&dal rule, the minimum term of retention is
three years. In practice, however, it appears unclear for what term
retention bonuses are awarded. Even personnel managers of differ-
ent ministries disagree in concrete cases on the exact term that
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applies. Nonetheless, the vast majority of receivers of supplements
is satisfied with the term for which the additions are awarded. This
may mean that either the terms are tailor-made to the persons in-
volved or that one is indifferent with respect to the term of retention.
The latter seems likely because a difference in the term has very
limited consequences. First, because the new employer of somebody
who leaves before the end of the retention period often compensates
his or her new employee for the loss of the premium in one way or
another. Second, practice shows that most people who receive a
retention bonus for one year receive the premiimi the following year
again. Personnel managers of different ministries affirm that, once
somebody has been awarded an addition, it is difficult to deny it next
time.
EFFECTIVENESS
Although the additions, in principle, are meant for both retention
and recruitment of employees, only 2 percent of the respondents
were awarded the addition when they were recruited.* Half of them
mentioned the supplements as the actual reason for accepting the
job. However, it appears that these persons have never worked in the
private sector, rather they were recruited from other parts of the
public sector. Obviously, the additions are almost irrelevant for
recruiting employees from the private sector.'
Ministries seem reluctant in deploying supplements for the
purpose of recruitment for two reasons. First, they do not want
entrants still having to prove themselves in the organization to inter-
fere with the existing earnings structure. Using an addition for re-
cruitment may imply that entrants immediately earn more than their
colleagues and possibly even more than their chief. Moreover, it is
hardly possible to deny entrants an addition an addition next year.
Second, ministries think more and more in terms of management
development. In this personnel strategy, they recruit young employ-
ees for junior positions while offering them the prospect of develop-
ing management skills and promotions to senior positions. In such a
situation of an internal labor market, short-term considerations play
a minor role; rather, emphasis is put on strategic choices.
Obviously, in nearly all cases, the supplements are deployed to
prevent employees from leaving their service unit. Approximately 2
percent of the receivers of an addition leave their job. However,
moving within one ministry is a significant part of this mobility. It
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TABLE 4
LEAVERvS AND STAYERS ACCORDING TO THE
SIZE OF THE ADDITION
addition in % leavers for stayers
of salary publie sector market sector
0
7,.5
10
- 7.5%
- 10%
- 12.5%
> 12,5%
40
36
12
n
31
19
37
13
35
40
14
11
Total 100 100 100
TABLE 5
PERCENTAGE OF STAYERS WHO WOULD ALSO
HAVE STAYED WITHOUT AN ADDITION
size of the addition in % salary
0-7.5% 7.5-10% >10% total
yes, sure
yes, probably
no, probably not
no, sure
do not know
32
46
6
-
16
19
48
13
3
17
8
55
19
3
15
21
48
12
2
17
total 100 100 100 100
TABLE 6
ORIENTATION OF STAYERS TO ANOTHER JOB
those who
lost their
<35 35-44 >44 total job
no orientation
looking around
actively applying
other
19
69
9
3
38
54
5
3
54
37
8
1
37
54
6
3
56
31
10
3
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appears that less that 1 percent of the persons who are awarded an
addition leave for the market sector. An interesting question is
whether this very limited turnover is caused by the additions. In one
of the interviews, it was posed that an addition facilitates a transfer
to the market sector because supplements identify the persons who
are of specific value to their employer. Some light can be shed on
this question by comparing leavers and stayers on the basis of differ-
ent characteristics.
In Table 4 they are distinguished by the size of the additions. It
appears that half of the leavers for the market sector received a
supplement of more than 10 percent of their salary whereas three-
quarters of the leavers within the public sector received an addition
of less than 10 percent of their salary. With regard to the leavers, this
suggests that ministries award high supplements to those employees
who are most likely to leave for the market sector. As to the stayers,
however, this result suggests the additions may comprise a large
windfall component. The same suggestion follows from the last
column of Table 5 which displays that over two-thirds of the receiv-
ers of an addition would have stayed in the public sector anyway.
Only 14 percent think they would have left if the addition was not
awarded while only 2 percent report they were not sure of this.
It can be expected, in principle, that the retention effect will be
larger the longer the term of retention. A long retention period
means that the person involved ties himself up and will lose the
entire addition by quitting before the end of the binding term.
Indeed, the data provide some evidence that the windfall component
is lower the longer the term of retention, but this effect is very limit-
ed. The same holds true for the size of the supplement.
Table 5 displays that additions exceeding 10 percent of the salary
are more effective than supplements below 7.5 percent. Further
increments of the addition, however, yield diminishing returns. Only
7 percent of the leavers state that they would have stayed if the
supplement had been higher whereas 93 percent would have quit
anyway. The financial betterment of leavers is often so high that it
simply cannot be counterbalanced by an addition. Moreover, in
particular, young, highly educated people sometimes choose to work
in the public sector during several years after having completed their
university education. They take advantage of the educational facili-
ties offered by employers in the public sector in order to increase
their educational level further. Only after having invested in their
career by gaining experience and knowledge do they leave for the
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market sector.
Both leavers and stayers are asked for what reasons employees
change their jobs. Notably, employees who changed their jobs within
the public sector report more frequently than those who left for the
market sector that they did so for financial reasons. Stayers seeming-
ly have a biased perception of the motives of leavers because the
differences in the answers of the two groups are striking. Eight-five
percent of the stayers think that people leave the public sector for
financial reasons ^ereas only 29 percent of those who have actually
left for the market sector mention financial betterment as their
motive. Fifty-three percent of the leavers mention the content of
their new jd) as their primary motive whereas only 5 percent of the
stayers think that this is a reason to leave the public sector.
On the one hand, leavers probably hesitate to recc^nize that they
left the public service for money. Many personnel managers report
that the finandal motive is rarely mentioned during exit interviews
though they often feel that it was an important reason. On the other
hand, however, stayers are likely to have a biased perception of the
motives of the leavers. Anyhow, the finandal motive plays a substan-
tial role. Employees who move to the market sector enjoy substantial
finandal betterments: three-quarters of them receive an increment
that exceeds the addilion while they probably also gain in terms of
fringe benefits.
JOB ORIENTATION
The data also provide information about job orientation. Table 6
shows that orientation to other jobs diminishes according to age
while older employees appear to orient themselves strongly to the
public sector. Only 6 percent of all stayers actually applied for
another job while another 3 percent already have the prospect of a
new job. Furthermore, 54 percent of them are interested in devel-
opments on the labor market and are looking for possiinUties. Over
one-third (37 percent) of all stayers do not orient themselves to
another job.
The figures concerning those stayers who did not receive an
addition anymore after es^ation of the retention term are some-
what different. Over half of them (56 percent) do not orient them-
selves to another job while 31 percent are lookii^ around for possi-
bilities on the labor market. However, the interpretation of these
data is unclear. On the one hand, they may si^est a limited efficacy
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because those who do not receive an addition anymore do not seem
eager to move. On the other hand, however, the data may suggest
that those whose labor market position has been weakened were not
awarded an addition anymore. This would suggest that the additions
were awarded to the right selection of employees, that is, those who
are considering a job change. The stayers who orient themselves to
another job were asked whether they are looking at the market
sector or at the public sector. It appears that they do not confine
themselves to the market sector: 55 percent are looking at both the
public and the market sector. Notably, if one orients oneself to one
sector, this is more often the public sector than the market sector.
The award of a retention bonus does not imply that one does not
orient oneself to other jobs. This hold true even if the term of reten-
tion is over one year, although in this case the tendency to look for a
job within the public sector is somewhat stronger. In particular,
within one ministry it is possible to change one's job without having
to refund the retention bonus. No wonder, therefore, that a long
retention period reduces one's interest in jobs in the market sector
but does not reduce one's interest in another job within the public
sector. Finally, two other factors also affect job orientation. Re-
spondents appear to orient themselves more strongly to the market
sector the higher their salary scale while women appear to orient
themselves more strongly to the public sector than men.
It seems useful to stress some of the data. First, a very limited
part-less than 10 percent of all stayers-is actively applying for a job
or already has the prospect of another job. Second, less than one
percent of those receiving an addition has moved to the market
sector. Third, two-thirds of those who stayed in their job would also
have stayed without a supplement. Obviously, mobility between the
public and market sector is limited. This conclusion is reinforced by
the fact that 54 percent of the respondents had never worked in the
market sector at the moment they were awarded an addition. Thus,
initial employment in the public sector often implies that the entire
career will evolve in the same sector with the exception of those
young persons with specific expertise who deliberately work for
several years in the public sector in order to jump off to a senior
position in the market sector.
SIDE EFFECTS
The supplement may bring about both a positive and a negative
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TABLE 7
ASPECTS OF AN EMPLOYER THAT ARE
CONSIDERED IMPORTANT
all
respondents
content of the job
personal responsibility
working climate
salary
relation between pay
and performance
career possibilities
organization
fringe benefits
educational facilities
job security
workload
status
total
88
72
64
55
50
41
37
25
23
20
15
7
100
leavers for
market sector
76
82
41
29
47
59
65
24
18
12
6
18
100
leavers non-
receivers of
an addition
86
69
57
81
50
57
31
40
26
17
14
10
100
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effect. The positive effect arises fi-om the feeling among receivers of
an addition of being appreciated, whereas the negative effect stems
form the feeling with some non-receivers of having been passed
over. One-third of the respondents, being receivers of a supplement,
mention the negative effect among non-receivers of the feeling of
having been passed over. It can be expected that this percentage
would have been substantially higher if the same question were
asked of non-receivers. This negative side effect is an extra reason to
deploy additions very selectively. One of the ministries that has
awarded the supplements over a broad range reported that big
intemal problems were the result.
The addition may also influence the image of the public sector as
employer. Generally, the majority of respondents ranks the market
sector higher than the public sector. The opposite only appears to be
true as far as job security is concerned. Furthermore, the public
sector is judged slightly better as to the content of the work, educa-
tional facilities, the working climate, and the workload. As to the
salary, the fringe benefits, the status, the personal responsibility, the
organization, and the relation between pay and performance, the
market sector is ranked much higher. Obviously, the overall judg-
ment is favorable for the market sector: 68 percent of the respond-
ents rank the market sector higher. Only 10 percent rank the public
sector higher, whereas 22 percent rank both sectors equally. Notably,
respondents tend to rank the public sector somewhat higher the
higher their salary scale. Thus, it is not true that dissatisfaction with
the public sector as employer particularly occurs in the higher ranks.
Table 7 displays that the content of the job, the personal respon-
sibility, the working climate, and the salary are judged the most
important aspects of an employer. If one aims at improving the
image of the public sector as employer, it would thus be wrong to
concentrate on financial matters only. This conclusion finds support
furthermore in the finding that two-thirds of the respondents state
that the introduction of supplements has not altered the image of the
public sector as employer.
SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
In the Netherlands an apparent gap between public- and market-
sector pay can be observed. However, mobility between the two
sectors is very limited. Nonetheless, the Dutch government has
introduced two instruments of a so-called differentiated pay policy:
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retention bonuses and labor market allowances (in a ratio of 2:1).
The additions mimily accrue to men who are highly educated, well-
paid, between 35 and 45 years of age, and who belong to the four
centrally des%aated ^oups: accouBtimts, automation e^qterts, finan-
cial economists, and tax experts. On average, the supplements
amount to 9 percent of the gross annual w£^e whidi is in the order
of one monthly salary.
In practice the difference between retention bonuses and market
allowances appears to be undear. Allhoi^ the additions are meant
for both retention and recruitment of employees, they are used
almost exdusively for retention purfioses. Furthermore, the supple-
ments have not driven out other possibilities to credit employees
with extra rewards. Nearly (Mie-third of the aiMkions cumulates with
other spedal rewards such as gratuities and extra annual increments.
However, most ministries set Umitedons on the cumulation of extra
rewards. Moreover, they tend to integrate the different arrange-
ments into one differentiated pay pc^cy in an attempt to link pay to
performance. Both managers and employees in the pubic sector
consider the supplements the only successful attempt to break
through the pay automatism (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken,
1991:68).
GeneraUy, public sector employees are rather satisfied about the
newly introduced instrumeitfs of pay policy. Moreover, this positive
judgment does not stem from coatentedness \nth the efficacy of the
supplements, rather one considers the additions an extra possibility
to stimulate well functioning employees by awarding them extra
rewards. Sometimes it appears a problem to reclaim the retention
bonus. Employees who were awarded such a premium but moved
before the retention terms expired must refund a gross amount
whereas they received a net amount. Although later fiscal clearance
occurs, this hampers a smooth functioning of the retention bonus.
It appears that only 10 percent of those who are awarded a
supplement consider this an appropriate instnuneat for retention or
recruitment of employees. Over half consider the addition to be too
low. Receivers of a retention bonus do not have a dear preference
for shorter or l(Higer periods of retention. Therefore it seems likely
that they are rather indifferent as to the extension term.
The efficacy of the supplements seems limited. Only 14 percent
of those who stayed in their job state that they would have moved if
they were not awarded an addition. Another indication for a limited
efficacy is that a small part (less than 10 percent) of those who
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stayed in their job is actively applying for another job while the same
holds true for those who do not receive an addition anymore.
Moreover, people who move to another job mention the content of
the job as their primary motive.
The supplements may bring about a positive and a negative side
effect. The positive effect arises from the feeling among receivers of
an addition of being appreciated by their employer. The negative
effect stems from the feeling among some non-receivers of having
been passed over. The latter effect is an extra reason to award
supplements very selectively.
According to the unions, the additions are useful instruments of a
differentiated pay policy. However, in their view, the supplements
cannot prevent a new exodus of employees from the public sector
after the exodus that already occurred in the early 1980s. The unions
deem it necessary to tackle the structural gap between public and
market pay. They state that the current lack of mobility between the
two sectors is due to several factors. First, as a consequence of the
exodus in the early 1980s, many young people were put in positions
which they would have attained at a later stage of their career ac-
cording to a more usual career pattern. In view of their age, they
earn a reasonable wage, consequently, do not feel the need to move.
Second, according the unions, the pay gap is partly solved by rank
inflation. However, this is denied by the Dutch Interior Minister
(Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken, 1990a:4). Although she admits
that, during the 1980s, the average scale level has been increased by
0.8, she states that the underlying reason is not rank infiation. The
main reason is an increase in the quality of labor inputs causing a
higher ranking of jobs according to the system of job evaluation and,
consequently, an increase of the average scale level.
Third, the imions state that the public sector is suffering a quality
loss. They are convinced that this is an invisible and stealthy process
already going on during a number of years. This would be in line
with the finding that relatively few young university graduates seek a
job in the public sector (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken,
1989:14). It is possible, mdeed, that the public sector is losing quality
by recruiting lower quality employees than the market sector.
However, the problem is how to measure such possible differences.
NOTES
1, The author is indebted to George Frederickson, Scott M. Fuess, Jr., Hyder
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Lakhani, Lois Wise, and two anonymous referees for their valuable comments on
earlier versions of this article.
2. The differential <MI Level 3 was not statislicalty sigftiTicant. From Level 4, however,
all differentials were statistically significant.
3. However, Lewis (1991) idiows that a pladd surface may hide changes in turnover
pattems. He finds for the U.S. that propensities to leave the federal service have
arisen among e n ^ c ^ e s with subiMantial federal experience and perhaps among
the college-educated.
4. The survey was sent to 494 persons. The response was 68 percent while 66 percent
of the questionnaires that were sent out could be used for analyses. This implies
that nearly 10 percent of the receivers of either a stay premium or a labor market
allowance are involved in th« analyses.
5. Practice shows, however, that lecbuming rarely poses a problem. Occasionally one
refuses to refund the grocs addition, ratber one refunds the net amount received.
6. Thus, the Dutch data seem contrary to Wise's findings for two federal agencies in
the USA (in this issue).
7. People outside the centrmUy designated groups receiving additions primarily hold
high general managerial positions.
8. Lower level governments deploy additions more frequently for recruiting purposes
than central govemment. It also seems that municipalities tend to judge the effec-
tiveness of the additions more favorably than central govemment (BINNEN-
LANDS BESTUUR, 27 July, 1990). The implementation of a differentiated pay
policy, however, seems to be laborious at local govemment level (1990).
9. Surprisingly enough, about half of the reqwndents themselves think that additions
do facilitate the recruitment of personnel.
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